CVEsbeam-cloudCVE-2026-120306Published Nov 1, 12:49 · Updated Nov 1, 12:49 UTC
9.9
CriticalCVSS 3.1 · from JFROG
CVE-2026-120306

Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation

github.com/beam-cloud/beta9 · CWE-653 · CWE-653
Affectedgithub.com/beam-cloud/beta9
FixUpdate to 0.1.756 or newer
PublishedNov 1, 12:49 · JFROG
ScoredNov 1 · 9.9 · JFROG
Exploit code publicNone known · checked 23:18 UTC
ExploitedNone known · CISA KEV checked 23:19 UTC

What we know

No known exploitation. CISA KEV, checked 23:19 UTC.
No public exploit code known. Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, checked 23:18 UTC.
An attacker needs network access and an account. CVSS: network, low privileges.
A successful attack can read and change data and take the service down. CVSS: high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.

Description

Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.

From JFROG

Affected and fixed versions

ProductAffectedFixed ingithub.com/beam-cloud/beta9before 0.1.7560.1.756

Exploit code

Exploit-DBnone knownMetasploitnone knownNucleinone known

References

Beta9 repository · github.comproductHandle sandbox edge cases (fix pull request) · github.compatchFix commit a28bf12 · github.compatchworker-0.1.756 · github.comrelease notes

Other CVEs in github.com/beam-cloud/beta9

All 2 →
9.9Beta9 host filesystem exposure via volume path traversal · CVE-2026-120308Nov 19.9Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths · CVE-2026-120307Nov 1