CVEstrailofbitsCVE-2026-14535Published Jul 4, 13:31 · Updated Jul 6, 14:58 UTC
8.8
HighCVSS 3.1 · from BombadilSystems
CVE-2026-14535

Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()

fickling · CWE-693 · CWE-693
Affectedfickling
FixUpdate to 0.1.12 or newer
PublishedJul 4, 13:31 · BombadilSystems
ScoredJul 4 · 8.8 · BombadilSystems
Exploit code publicNone known · checked 21:18 UTC
ExploitedNone known · CISA KEV checked 22:07 UTC

What we know

No known exploitation. CISA KEV, checked 22:07 UTC.
No public exploit code known. Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, checked 21:18 UTC.
An attacker only needs network access to the target. No login needed. CVSS: network, no privileges.
Someone has to open, click or run something first. CVSS: user interaction required.
A successful attack can read and change data and take the service down. CVSS: high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
A successful attack gives full control of the affected system. CISA: technical impact total.

Description

In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.

From BombadilSystems

Affected and fixed versions

ProductAffectedFixed inficklingup to 0.1.11–ficklingNot affected0.1.12

Exploit code

Exploit-DBnone knownMetasploitnone knownNucleinone known

References

GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429 · github.comFix PR #278 — Split shorten_code() formatting from dedup tracking, make MLAllowlist opt-in · github.comFix commit 41ce7cb (squash merge of PR #278) · github.comFickling v0.1.12 release · github.com

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