CVEsApache Software FoundationCVE-2026-84170Published Nov 1, 22:22 · Updated Nov 1, 22:22 UTC
8.3
HighCVSS 4.0 · from apache
CVE-2026-84170

Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource

org.apache.wicket:wicket-core · Allocation without limits · CWE-770
Affectedorg.apache.wicket:wicket-core
FixNo fix listed yet.
PublishedNov 1, 22:22 · apache
ScoredNov 1 · 8.3 · apache
Exploit code publicNone known · checked 23:18 UTC
ExploitedNone known · CISA KEV checked 23:19 UTC

What we know

No known exploitation. CISA KEV, checked 23:19 UTC.
No public exploit code known. Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, checked 23:18 UTC.
An attacker only needs network access to the target. No login needed. CVSS: network, no privileges.
It only works under certain conditions, which makes it harder to pull off. CVSS: high attack complexity.
A successful attack can take the service down. CVSS impact.

Description

Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all. Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

From apache

Affected and fixed versions

ProductAffectedFixed inorg.apache.wicket:wicket-core9.14.0 – 9.24.0–org.apache.wicket:wicket-core10.0.0 – 10.9.1–

Exploit code

Exploit-DBnone knownMetasploitnone knownNucleinone known

References

lists.apache.org/thread.html/bw3hn5cch3q7yrsl05m8mvmgyx4m98y7 · lists.apache.orgvendor advisory

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